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Abstract 
In this paper I would like to outline a comprehensive theory of legal interpretation based on an 
assumption that legal text, understood as the aggregate of texts of all legal acts in force at a particular 
time and place, describes one rational and coherent possible world. The picture of this possible world 
is decoded from the text by interpreters and serves as a holistic model to which the real world is 
adjusted when the law is applied. 
From the above premise I will limit myself to drawing two conclusions for how legal 
interpretation should be carried out. First, I argue that the possible world described by the legal text 
has to be ‘accessible’ from the real world, i.e. it has to be feasible to transform the actual world into 
the described one. Were it otherwise, the possible world could not serve as a model for adjustment. 
The accessibility requirement imposes obligations on the interpreters to secure the rationality of the 
possible world decoded from the text, amongst other to secure that the description of this world is not 
contradictory and – as a consequence – the law of excluded middle is obeyed in the possible world 
described by the legal text.  
Secondly, I argue for the inevitability of interpretative discretion arising from the requirement 
to decode a sufficiently ‘saturated’ picture of the possible world., i.e. possessing enough properties to 
resemble the actual world. As texts have a limited number of sentences and worlds have an unlimited 
number of properties, interpreters have to supplement the picture of a possible world to achieve its 
coherence. This involves the inclusion of some additional, non-predetermined features that integrate 
with the properties of the world predefined by the legal text. This process of saturation consists of 
filling in so-called ‘places of indeterminacy’ (Roman Ingarden) with content implicated by other 
features of the possible world. I also argue that the discretion resulting from the necessity of filling in 
the places of indeterminacy is justified by the requirement of fulfilling the intention of the lawmaker to 
make the possible world described by the legal text real.  
The theory presented here is based on contemporary theories of discourse representation and 
so-called ‘text-world theory’ by J. Gavins.  Phenomenalism and causal (historical) theories of 
reference provide its philosophical background. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper presents an element of a broader legal-philosophical concept based on the 
assumption that the law is an instrument of designing the future of a given society.  The main 
tool used to design the future is a legal text, which describes the future possible world1.  
Those to whom the law is addressed have an obligation to transform what is described by the 
legal text into reality and that obligation can have various origins.  It originally derives from 
the lawmaker’s illocutionary intention, i.e. the intention to have the legal text serve as a model 
for shaping the real world2. An additional source of the obligation to adjust the actual world to 
the model delineated by the legal text is the threat of coercion by a sovereign (an entity with 
appropriate actual force). In the event of noncompliance, the sovereign may force the 
addressees of the law to realize a possible world described by the legal text (where the 
lawmaker and the sovereign do not have to be the same at a given point in time).  Neither the 
illocutionary intention nor threat of coercion by the lawmaker/sovereign preclude a situation 
where the addressees of the law accept the vision of the world presented in the legal text and 
make it happen without any need for coercion. 
Under the conceptual framework presented here the key concepts for the law can be 
defined as follows: 
a) lawmaking is designing the future by describing or changing a description of the 
future possible world, with the use of the legal text understood as a collection of texts 
of all acts of law in force at a given moment in time; 
b) legal interpretation is a text-based depiction of a possible world to be made real by a 
given society; 
c) application of law is the adjustment of the real world to the picture of a possible 
world presented in the legal text or punishment for failure to adjust. 
                                                 
1
 The contention that legal language is descriptive may surprise readers because of a long tradition of treating 
utterances of a lawmaker as normative statements (commands). This tradition, to my view, has been based in a 
misguided application of the speech-act theory to the analysis of legal language, and caused lawyers to believe 
that a legal rule is a single utterance of a single speaker, resembling an oral command. I question such an 
approach and believe that legal language should be understood as a set of written utterances (a discourse) that are 
descriptive in their nature (which is confirmed by the use of verbs like "is", "shall" and other verbs of assertion). 
As such, legal language should rather be analysed as a set of text-acts and treated as a complex tool for 
describing a model of reality which is then set as a model to which to adjust the real world. What lawyers 
traditionally call 'normativity' finds its source outside legal language and not in the language itself. 
2
 For illocutionary intention see the argumentation in further parts of the paper, devoted to lawmaking 
understood as creating a legal text (p. 7 et seq.). 
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Hence, the law is a tool for changing the reality.  The change takes place by way of 
permanently adjusting the current reality to the description of a potential reality contained in 
the legal text.  I assume that a specific legal provision is a description of an element of the 
potential reality (a state of affairs), while the entire legal text in force at a particular time is a 
description of one potential reality (a possible world).  
In this paper I am limiting myself to discussing some issues in legal interpretation 
resulting from the above-presented concept of law. The focal point of the conceptual 
framework presented here is the legal text and not its author. Hence, this concept of legal 
interpretation is text-centric, unlike a majority of conceptual frameworks for the legal 
interpretation, which can be considered author-centric. The reason for concentrating on the 
legal text is the conviction that it is the only objective tangible fact whose existence is not 
challenged by legal philosophers. The same cannot be said about the lawmaker or intentions 
ascribed to the lawmaker or about the meaning of the text – their existence, nature and impact 
on the interpretation have been continually questioned in legal philosophy. 
2. The main theses behind the concept 
Set forth below are the main theses making up the concept of legal interpretation 
presented in this article. 
i. Legal text (To), understood as the aggregate of all provisions contained in all acts of law in 
force at a given place and time, is a description of one possible world (PW).  
ii. As a rule3, every legal provision, treated as a sentence of the legal text from one full stop 
to another (Pp), describes one property (W1) of PW, which is a state of affairs in the 
possible world PW. One property W1 may be described by several Pps. 
iii. The world PW has an infinite number of properties W1. The text To describes a finite 
number of such W1.  This means that To does not fully describe the world PW.  Therefore, 
in the process of legal interpretation, the world PW must be saturated with additional 
elements not described in the To to make the structure of the world PW sufficiently rich to 
be a model for adjusting the real world (RW). 
                                                 
3
 Legal text also contains provisions which do not describe a possible world but present a manner in which a 
description of a possible world may be changed.  Those provisions exist both in public law (e.g., constitutional 
provisions describing a legislative procedure) and in private law (e.g., provisions concerning contracts or 
statements of will).  Those provisions are an equivalent of rules of change according to H.L.A. Hart’s 
terminology. 
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iv. The description of the world PW is hierarchical – certain parts of To describe general 
properties of PW, while others its detailed properties.  The description of PW’s detailed 
properties cannot modify PW contrary to the description of PW included in those parts of 
To which are higher in the hierarchy (e.g., constitutions). 
v. PW is not a real (actual) world, PW is a possible world, accessible from the real world 
RW: causalities existing in RW make it possible to achieve PW. PW’s
 
accessibility is the 
key requirement that influences the way in which To is understood.  For PW to be 
accessible from RW, it must be ontologically similar to the actual world, hence, among 
other things, it must be a rational world in which the law of excluded middle is obeyed.  
This means that the description of the possible world PW
 
contained in the legal text must 
not be contradictory. 
vi. The primary obligation of the addressees of the law is that of making PW real. To achieve 
the world PW means that such properties W1 (states of affairs) will come into existence in 
the world RW, which will make each Pp true and thus will make the whole To true in RW.  
vii. The origin of the obligation to make PW real is the sovereign’s intention to change RW in 
the direction indicated by To. This is an illocutionary − not locutionary − intention: it is 
not an intention as to the specific semantic meaning of a legal text but an intention to have 
a legal text serve as a model for adjusting the real world. Another source of obligation 
may be a threat of coercion by the sovereign towards those who fail to make the world 
PW real, or the acceptance of the vision of the world described by PW by the addressees 
of the law.  
viii. Through legal interpretation one depicts a fragment of the world PW, which is to serve as 
a model for adjustment of the relevant component of RW. 
ix. The application of law consists of comparing the world RW with the depiction of the 
world PW by persons described as authorized to do so by To. It involves those persons 
formulating individual and specific utterances (individual and specific rules) ordering a 
change of RW in such a way that RW’s properties would be changed into W1 described by 
To. 
x. The obligation to make PW real is more important than the obligation to make a single W1 
(a single state of affairs in PW) real. If making any of W1 real makes it impossible to 
make the whole PW real, then the realization of such W1 should be abandoned (this thesis 
highlights the key significance of the principle of proportionality in law). 
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3. Philosophical underpinnings 
 
In this section I briefly discuss the philosophical background for the above listed 
theses; in particular, assumptions as to the philosophical and linguistic bases for the concept. 
I. The meaning of a text as a complex mental representation – the discourse 
representation theory and the text world theory  
One of the assumptions behind the concept presented here is that the interpretation of 
a text consists of reading it and – as a result of reading – creating in the interpreter’s mind a 
complex structure of meanings constituting a mental representation of the world described in 
the text. This contention is an element of two conceptions: a philosophically broader theory of 
discourse representation and a narrower one limited to the text, viz. text world theory. 
The discourse representation theory was first presented by H. Kamp4. The basic 
assumption for this theory is that a discourse − understood as a complex process of language 
communication unfolding over time − is interpreted by its participant as a whole (as a single 
expression), even if it usually consists of many expressions. Such holistic interpretation is 
possible according to the theory because each utterance of a discourse incrementally 
contributes to a complex mental representation in the interpreter’s mind, and this constitutes 
an integral representation of that discourse. 
The discourse representation theory in relation to literary interpretation evolved into 
the text world theory developed by J. Gavins5. According to this theory, the text is inevitably 
(because of biological and cognitive factors) understood as a picture of the world which the 
reader creates in his or her mind as a mental representation. The process of creating a mental 
representation of the world as a picture of the world is as follows:  
a) Each sentence of a text projects an element of mental representation – a depiction of a 
state of affairs. For instance, the first sentence of G. Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four “It 
was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking thirteen.” brings forth a mental 
representation of the state of affairs in which certain properties exist concerning, inter 
alia, temperature, season and time. 
                                                 
4
 H. Kamp, A Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation, [in:] J.A.G. Groenendijk, T.M.V. Janssen, and 
M.B.J. Stokhof (ed.), Formal Methods in the Study of Language .Mathematical Centre Tracts 135, Amsterdam 
1981. 
5
 J. Gavins, Text World Theory, An Introduction, Edinburgh 2007. 
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b) This picture of the state of affairs is integrated by the reader into the epistemic framework 
of a possible world. The reason for such perception of possible states of affairs is the fact 
that the perception of the actual states of affairs always takes place within the framework 
(context) of the real world. It is a cognitive impossibility to perceive states of affairs in 
isolation from the world. 
c) Certain sentences of a text co-refer, i.e. they relate to the same state of affairs.  Each new 
sentence of a text which co-refers modifies the created mental representation; against the 
background of such changed representation, the next co-referring sentence of the text is 
interpreted.  For example, the second sentence of Nineteen Eighty-Four: “Winston Smith, 
his chin nuzzled into his breast in an effort to escape the vile wind, slipped quickly 
through the glass doors of Victory Mansions” modifies the mental representation created 
by the first sentence from a) above by adding new elements to that representation (a man, 
a building, the wind, etc.).  It is so because the sentence quoted is an element of the same 
discourse (in this case, the text of the same novel) whose representation is created 
incrementally in the reader’s mind as he or she reads further sentences of the text. 
d) Reading all sentences of the text which refer to the same state of affairs creates a complete 
mental representation of that state of affairs6 – such mental representation is the meaning 
of the fragment of the text which is interpreted. 
e) The mental representation of all states of affairs described by a given text creates the 
mental representation of that text’s world. 
The process of creating the mental representation of a text originally arose in the 
context of literary texts; as it is universal there is no reason why it could not apply to other 
types of texts, including legal texts. 
 
II. Application of the text world theory to a legal text 
I am assuming that reading a legal text also leads to the creation in the reader’s mind 
of a picture of the world as a mental representation of the read text, because the legal text 
designs a possible world by describing it.  For instance, in the world described by a Polish 
legal text the Republic of Poland is a democratic state governed by the rule of law (Article 2 
of the Polish Constitution) in which he who kills a man is subject to a penalty (Article 148 of 
                                                 
6
 For the completeness of mental representation see a discussion on supplementing places of indeterminacy in 
part 4 of this paper. 
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the Polish Criminal Code). Every legal provision understood as a sentence from one period to 
the next designs an element of the possible world7.   
In the case of a legal text, the reconstruction of the text world consists of combining 
meanings of individual provisions into one whole. First, an interpreter selects sentences of the 
legal text which refer to the same state of affairs – hence s/he selects the relevant legal 
provisions. Next, taking into account all those sentences/provisions, s/he creates a mental 
representation of the state of affairs to which the meanings of individual provisions 
contribute, supplementing or modifying such mental representation. For instance, when 
reading Article 148 §1 of the Polish Criminal Code8 one first establishes a preliminary 
representation of the state of affairs in which someone kills a man and is subject to a penalty. 
Next, one modifies that mental representation after reading Article 25 of the Criminal Code9, 
according to which a person who acts in self-defence does not perpetrate a crime.  In further 
stages of the reconstruction, the interpreter adds further elements of the state of affairs to their 
mental representation, described by other relevant legal provisions.  The final outcome of the 
process is a holistic mental representation of the state of affairs related to ‘killing a man and 
being subject to penalty’, created as a result of determining the meaning of all sentence of a 
legal text relevant for that state of affairs.  
According to the assumptions of the discourse representation theory and the text world 
theory, a given text makes up the mental representation of that text’s world as a result of 
integrating mental representations of all states of affairs described. In relation to a legal text, 
we may say that all provisions of a legal text refer to a single complex state of affairs which 
comprises the legal text world, and this legal text world can be understood as a possible 
world. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The idea of a world created by a legal text is not new.  As pointed out by R. Sarkowicz:“Just as any other text 
postulates, delineates or describes a certain world, also in a legal text we can find a vision of a certain world 
(…).  A reconstruction, description of such world, which is depicted with the use of a legal text, is what we refer 
to as its descriptive (literal) interpretation”. R. Sarkowicz, Poziomowa interpretacja tekstu prawnego [Level-
based interpretation of a legal text], Kraków 1996, pp. 96-97. A similar concept of the postulated world was 
presented earlier by Jan Woleński in Logiczne problemy wykładni prawa [Logical problems of legal 
interpretation], Kraków 1972. 
8
 ‘Whoever kills a human being shall be subject to the penalty of the deprivation of liberty for a minimum term 
of 8 years, the penalty of deprivation of liberty for 25 years, or the penalty of deprivation of liberty for life.’ 
9
 ‘Whoever in necessary defence repels a direct illegal attack on any interest protected by law shall not be 
deemed to have committed an offence.’ 
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III. Making, interpreting and applying law in terms of the presented conceptual 
framework 
The conceptual theses formulated above may be translated into three processes: the 
process of lawmaking, legal interpretation and the application of law.  The discussion of each 
of those processes may help to identify consequences which this concept entails for 
discussions in legal philosophy. 
a) Lawmaking 
To make laws is to depict a possible world by adding/removing descriptive sentences 
in relation to an already existing description (an earlier legal text)10.  Descriptive sentences 
(legal provisions) are formulated based on rules characteristic for the positivist concept of law 
– lawmaking is a social fact and is carried out by entities authorized to do so, whereas the 
issue of the conformity/non-conformity of a legal provision with morality is not relevant when 
deciding whether it will be considered as a valid element of the description of the possible 
world.  Hence, no validating relation exists between law and morality at the level of 
lawmaking. It may exist, however, at the level of legal interpretation, as elaborated upon in 
point b) below. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, an important role at the stage of drafting 
a legal text is played by the lawmaker’s illocutionary intention, i.e. the intention that a legal 
text should be a model for adjusting the actual world. The illocutionary intention, unlike the 
locutionary intention, is not the intention to give a specific semantic meaning to the text.  It is 
an intention as to the illocutionary force of a text: that the text would be a source for 
designing a model to which the actual world should be adjusted. This anchors the normativity 
of the law in the person of the lawmaker without going into problematic issues of the original 
meaning of the text and how a collective body may express a locutionary (semantic) intention. 
I accept that it is possible to attribute an overall illocutionary intention to a lawmaker acting 
as a group of people in the form of “I want this text to become a law”, but it is not possible to 
attribute a specific locutionary intention of “I want the text T to mean Y”.  The meaning of a 
text is determined by an interpreter, relying on his knowledge and experience at the time 
when making the interpretation, as discussed in the next section of the paper.  
                                                 
10
 A description of a world is created as a rule at the level of public law - the level at which provisions of the ius 
cogens type are made.  Some legal provisions are of the ius dispositivum type, hence they allow addressees of 
law to describe by themselves a fragment of the possible world which concerns them– e.g. by executing an 
agreement or a will.  This means that not the entire possible world PW is determined by the lawmaker’s 
description because some of its aspects are determined via private descriptions by addressees of law, as part of 
private actions with legal consequences. 
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b) Legal interpretation 
This is a stage when the interpreter of legal text reconstructs from it a representation of 
a possible world. This is done by establishing a meaning of a certain group of provisions 
which describe interconnected elements of a potential reality. The interpreter wants to 
reconstruct this description in order to get a point for reference for the actual reality and check 
whether it conforms to the law. This reconstruction allows the interpreter to reach an explicit 
model to which to adjust the actual world. Under the theory presented in this paper, this 
explicit model performs the function of a legal rule. 
This process takes place within the framework of signification (the understanding of 
the text), and not the process of communication (the understanding of the author of the text).  
As such, it relies on the determination of the meaning of the text by referring not to the 
lawmaker’s locutionary intention, but to the public meaning of the text established at the time 
of making the interpretation11. 
 From a philosophical perspective, the relation of the interpreter to the text and to 
reality is his relation to two phenomena: the phenomenon of the text and the phenomenon of 
the reality. In the process of application of the law, the phenomenon of the reality is available 
to the interpreter not directly but through phenomena of texts describing the actual reality or 
phenomena of verbal utterances (e.g. witness statements, information on the facts of a matter, 
etc.). Hence, an epistemological compatibility between the real world and the paradigm of 
behaviour/depiction of the possible world is ensured – both are available to a lawyer as the 
phenomena of texts or phenomena of verbal utterances. 
To realize how the process of understanding the text (including a legal text) proceeds, 
it is necessary to bear in mind that a word which is read causes a mental representation to be 
created in the reader’s mind – the meaning of the word read.  How is this representation 
created?  In the philosophy of language we can find many ideas explaining this process.  For 
the purposes of our discussion we may assume that the mental representation brought about 
by a word read (or heard) depends on the earlier experience of each person.  The process of 
learning a language in the earliest stages is therefore based on explanations of how words are 
connected with the world (e.g., through ostension, when we say a word and point to its 
referent, or through description when we give a definition of a term), so that it will later be 
possible to trigger in the mind of a given person the representation (memory, reminiscences) 
                                                 
11
 This thesis supports dynamic theories of law interpretation, opposing, among other things originalism as a 
theory of constitutional interpretation.  However, the nature of this paper prevents me from a more elaborate 
criticism of originalism and other static concepts of legal interpretation. 
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of the reality, with which persons speaking a given language usually associate that word12.  
Thus, our understanding of the language is influenced by experiencing the world, understood 
phenomenologically: partially different from and partially similar to the experience of other 
people.  To the extent people share experience, the understanding of certain terms is the same 
or similar.  To the extent experience is determined by the unique situation of a given person, 
there are differences and disputes as to the understanding of certain terms. The differences in 
mental representations produced by a given word, which are a result of the differences in our 
individual histories, usually do not impede successful communication; however, they may 
cause ambiguity and differences in understanding of a given word. 
Under the approach espoused here, the interpretation of a legal text does not consist of 
the simple determination of the meaning of a single utterance of a lawmaker followed by the 
determination of the references of those expressions during the process of the application of 
the law in the real world.  That particular approach to interpretation is the result of treating the 
lawmaker’s utterances as if they were individual oral orders, which is relatively common in 
legal philosophy13.  The appropriate interpretation of legal text is rather the interpretation of a 
number of written utterances – legal provisions – comprising the lawmaker’s discourse.  This 
process requires combining those provisions into one whole; the reconstructed fragment of the 
potential reality can be described by many legal provisions, whose content somewhat 
overlaps.  For instance, a provision of a statute and a provision of the Constitution may both 
refer to the same element of reality, just as different parts of a novel may describe the same 
element of a fictional reality – e.g. a protagonist’s flat. In this configuration, each of those 
provisions adds a new element to the description, enhancing the reader’s knowledge of the 
reality described.  
 
 
                                                 
12
 I am assuming that a mental representation may also include a representation brought about by theoretical and 
abstract terms (e.g., universalia).  I have arguments to support this claim; however, the framework of this paper 
does not make room for their presentation.  This argumentation is based on David Hume’s ‘copy principle’ and 
Ruth Millikan’s concept of language presented in Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories: New 
Foundations for Realism, MIT, 2001. 
13
 The blame for this misguided approach to legal language can be attributed, at least partially, to the general 
application of the speech act theory in legal philosophy; the theory is not well suited to analyze written 
communication and is not sufficiently precise to analyze sets of utterances (discourses).  See: M. Stubbs, Can I 
Have That In Writing, Please? Some Neglected Topics in Speech Act Theory Journal of Pragmatics, Volume 7, 
Issue 5, November 1983, Pages 479–494. 
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c) The application of law 
 
The process of application of law in the light of the theory presented here is a process: 
i. of determining whether the real world corresponds to the paradigm for adjustment 
reconstructed in the process of interpretation and whether any irregularities exist, 
ii. of taking measures to adjust the real world to the possible world by formulating 
individual and specific rules ordering or prohibiting certain actions, ordering redress of 
damage or rendering some actions null and void (i.e. non-existent in the possible 
world). 
As the main topic of this paper is legal interpretation, I will refrain from a deeper 
investigation here of the application of law. The purpose of the current brief discussion of that 
issue is merely to demonstrate that the concept of legal interpretation is an element of a larger 
whole, covering both the process of making and applying law. 
 
4. Examples of areas in which the concept may be applied 
 
I. Necessary saturation of the world PW as the justification for 
interpretative discretion  
As mentioned among the theses presented in section 2 of this paper, the property of 
every text is that the number of sentences used in the text is finite whereas the number of 
properties of the reality which the text describes is infinite. This means that a legal text in 
itself is not sufficient to describe a saturated picture of the possible world, i.e. one which can 
be a model for the real world.  A fully saturated picture of the world described by a legal text 
will be achieved by the inclusion of elements which constitute a frame for that world and 
natural supplements of that picture based− among other things − on the interpreter’s specific 
life experience. This phenomenon, often referred to as the supplementation of ‘places of 
indeterminacy’, was highlighted by R. Ingarden14.  Because of this disproportionality between 
the description and the world, it is necessary to provide additional descriptions for elements 
not included in the text.  Consequently, the process of reconstructing the potential reality 
takes place by reconstructing elements expressly described by a text and later adding elements 
which are not described by the text but are necessary to reconstruct the potential reality.  
                                                 
14
 R. Ingarden, Studia z estetyki [Studies in Aesthetics] vol. .2, PWN, Warsaw 1958, pp. 96-104 
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This practice of supplementing places of indeterminacy is a necessary one in the 
process of understanding a text and may serve as a starting point for a reflection on 
interpretative discretion in legal interpretation. In the process of saturating the picture of the 
possible world with properties not derived from the legal text, a lawyer-interpreter adds 
something from him/herself to the picture of the world designed by the lawmaker. In a sense, 
they take over the latter role. 
Leaving aside the issue of semantic discretion (discretion according to HLA Hart), let 
us analyze the area of discretion consisting of deriving norms from norms: the area of legal 
inferential reasoning.  Even though inferential reasoning is common in jurisprudence, it is 
difficult to justify in those conceptions of legal interpretation which are author-centric, and in 
particular in those favouring a positivistic approach.  First of all, we could argue that 
additional norms whose author is not the lawmaker do not meet the test of pedigree.  
Secondly, in the light of the single author fallacy and the absence of a single, precise 
locutionary intention of the lawmaker, it is hard to justify how some rules derive from others.  
As a result, a basic question arises regarding the legitimacy of such derivation.  
Alternatively, if we assume that: 
a) an interpreter does not reconstruct the lawmaker’s locutionary intention, but a possible 
world to make it real later in the process of the application of law; and that 
b) the description of the possible world is finite, but the number of properties of that 
world is infinite, 
then we will find a mandate to fill those places of indeterminacy with elements appropriate for 
the described elements of the reality. Were it otherwise, the implementation of the primary 
obligation arising from law (i.e. making the world described by a legal text real) would not be 
possible at all.  It is not possible to ‘partially’ realize the world if there is a causality between 
the element b, described in a legal text and an element a, which is not described in it. 
In addition to justifying a certain degree of legal discretion by giving it a logical 
connection with the obligation to make the world real, the concept proposed here provides a 
more holistic description of the process of inferential reasoning in law. In the classical 
approach, connections between norms built through inferential reasoning go in one direction: 
(from the underlying rule and to the rule derived from it). For that reason, the inferential 
reasoning in the classical understanding cannot ensure the systemic linkage between a greater 
number of rules. Under the conceptual framework presented here, states of affairs described 
by To may be linked on many levels and in many directions with other states of affairs 
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occurring in the described possible world PW. Since the world PW is a normative paradigm 
for the real world, systemic links among properties (states of affairs in that world) are an 
equivalent of links among rules under the classical understanding of the system of law. 
Therefore, their multi-level and multi-direction nature may be contrasted with the single-level 
and single-direction nature of inferential reasoning in the classical approach. 
Because the legal text world is a projection of a future holistic real world, it is not a 
paradigm for a given individual behaviour but a model of a state of affairs. As such it may be 
referred to complex aggregates of behaviours and effects of such behaviours. The approach 
presented here is more comprehensive than that of the classical understanding of a legal rule.  
The latter offers a paradigm for behaviour defining only the addressee, the circumstances and 
an action which is prohibited or ordered. In this approach, the law is seen as a collection of 
individual rules – paradigms for behaviour, not linked into a single whole by a wider context.  
Hence, a paradigm for behaviour is built in an overly individual way (e.g., it does not include 
links among several rules). In contrast to this, the concept of a possible world performing the 
function of a complex paradigm for behaviour is multi-faceted and encourages a holistic 
approach. Not simply a paradigm of individual behaviour, the model world allows a more 
universal and integrative approach for the purposes of legal interpretation. 
II. Accessibility of the world PW
 
 as a factor rationalizing the legal interpretation  
According to one of the theses of the conception presented here, the possible world 
PW is a world accessible from the real world RW. This means that such a world must be 
ontologically similar to the real world.  For instance, ordinary causalities operating in RW 
must be sufficient to achieve PW. 
The assumption of accessibility of the world described by the legal text is crucial for 
the process of legal interpretation. This assumption requires from the interpreter the 
reconstruction of the picture of the world which is rational in the sense that it does not 
significantly differ from the real world’s actual structure.  Irrationality of the possible world 
would make it incompatible with the real world (‘inaccessible’ in the language of the theory 
of possible words) and this would challenge the implementation of the essential legal 
obligation to bring into existence the possible world described by the legal text.  
The irrationality of the possible world PW could in particular consist of the law of 
excluded middle not applying in the world PW: a situation in which the property X 
simultaneously occurs and does not occur in that world.  This would entail a fundamental 
ontological difference between the real world (in which the law of excluded middle applies) 
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and the world PW. In the real world RW it is not possible for X and non-X to exist at the 
time;  this means that the world PW, in which such situation would be possible, would not be 
‘accessible’ from the real world. 
For a lawyer interpreting the legal text To this means that s/he cannot accept that the 
description of PW would be self-contradictory, that is would contain a given statement and its 
negation.  The existence of contradictions in To would make PW unfeasible, and then it could 
not serve as a model target for the real world.  So if we assume that the legal text describes 
one rationally organized possible world, the description must not be contradictory for that 
world to be realized, in order to fulfil the primary obligation arising from law, which is to 
make that world real. 
The argument of accessibility and therefore rationality of the world designed by the 
legal text justifies a number of arguments used by lawyers in legal interpretation: e.g. the use 
of ad absurdum argumentation and so-called ‘conflict of law’ rules (e.g., lex specialis derogat 
legi generali). The former does not allow for the acceptance of an unfeasible legal rule; the 
latter allows the interpreter to exclude one of two contradictory rules when deciding a case.  
All those types of argumentation under the author-centric theories suffer from a deficit of 
legitimacy, in the same way as argumentation based on referential rules (mentioned above).  
They are fully justified, however, in the light of the primary obligation imposed by the 
lawmaker, which is to make the possible world projected by the legal text real15. 
Finally, I would like to draw attention to a broader issue connected with the question 
of the ontological similarity of the real world to the world described by the legal text.  The 
issue is whether the accessibility of the possible world depends on the presence of certain 
moral rules in that world.  In other words, a question arises whether the legal text world must 
contain a certain morality to be accessible from the real world, i.e. realizable.  In the case of 
author-centric theories, invoking morality was usually treated as modifying or even opposing 
the intention of a positivistic lawmaker; by contrast, under the approach presented here, 
elements of morality constitute a factor influencing the possible world described by the legal 
text.  Those moral elements may either fill places of indeterminacy or even serve as a 
necessary element of the world to be made real, based on the assumption that it is not possible 
                                                 
15
 The assumption of the rationality of the world reconstructed from a legal text is another depiction of the 
assumption as to the lawmaker’s rationality. To date, in author-centric concepts, non-contradiction of law could 
be argued only based on the assumption of the lawmaker’s rationality, which has raised many doubts, in 
particular, in the light of problems deriving from single author fallacy. The rationale presented in this paper for 
the requirement of non-contradiction in law and of applying legal arguments based on the non-contradiction 
argument sees to havem a larger explicatory potential. 
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to make the world real without morality.  One may tentatively put forward the thesis that the 
possible world, deprived of any moral rules − or with a morality too different from the 
morality existing in the real world − is inaccessible from the real world; therefore, the 
reconstructed description of the possible world which does not take morality into account 
makes it impossible to carry out the fundamental obligations arising from law (bringing into 
existence the world described by the legal text).  This would mean that having to take some 
minimum degree of morality into consideration in law is a result of the nature of law 
understood as an instrument of designing the future world in which a given society will 
operate.  Failing to take morality into account would render the realization of such world 
impossible.  Though this is a very interesting issue, related to HLA Hart’s discussion of the 
viability thesis16, it would merit a separate paper to do it justice. 
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 See L. Green, Morality in Law, Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No 12/2013 February 2013, p. 18. 
